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! I’m going to try really hard to get it right
! I’m going to try to get it right
! I’m not going to try very hard
! I’m going to try to get it wrong



















































	 No	Feedback	 Feedback	 No	Feedback	 Feedback	
Judgements	of	confidence	in	answers	
(range	=	0-1)	
.69	(.22)	 .76	(.25)	 .70	(.17)	 .67	(.25)	
Mean	pre-test	question	intentions	
(range	=	1-3)	
2.88	(.35)	 3.00	(.02)	 2.90	(.30)	 2.74	(.54)	
Mean	post-test	intentions	(range	=	1-
3)	
2.51	(.66)	 2.49	(.59)	 2.71	(.52)	 2.36	(.70)	
Self-reported	metacognition	score	
(range	=	0-12)	








3.21	(5.13)	 7.67	(6.69)	 6.29	(5.73)	 7.30	(5.27)	
	
	
Judgments	of	confidence		
Participants’	ordinal	metacognitive	judgment	ratings	of	their	accuracy	to	each	question	on	a	
5-point	confidence	scale	(‘I’m	sure	I	got	it	right’;	‘I	think	I	got	it	right’;	‘I	don't	know’;	‘I	think	I	got	it	
wrong’;	‘I’m	sure	I	got	it	wrong’)	were	translated	question-by-question	into	interval	data	(1,	0.75,	
0.5,	0.25,	0)	for	the	analyses.		
	To	determine	whether	participants	assigned	higher	confidence	to	correct	compared	to	
incorrect	answers,	a	2	(Group)	x	2	(Condition:	Feedback	vs.	No	Feedback)	x	2	(Answer:	correct	vs.	
incorrect)	mixed-ANOVA	was	conducted,	where	Answer	was	the	within-participants	factor3.	There	
was	a	main	effect	of	Group,	F(1,	120)	=	4.15,	p	=	.04,	ηp²	=	.03,	whereby	the	ASD	group	were	
significantly	more	confident	generally	that	their	answers	were	correct	(M	=	.73,	SD	=	.23)	than	were	
the	TD	group	(M	=	.68,	SD	=	.21).	There	was	also	a	significant	main	effect	of	Answer,	F(1,	120)	=	
87.34,	p	<	.001,	ηp²	=	.42,	whereby	confidence	was	significantly	higher	for	correct	answers	(M	=	.80,	
SD	=	.18)	than	for	incorrect	answers	(M	=	.56,	SD	=	.27).	There	was	no	effect	of	Condition,	F(1,	120)	=	
.11,	p	=	.74,	ηp²	=	.001,	Group	x	Condition	interaction,	F(1,	120)	=	2.69,	p	=	.11,	ηp²	=.02,	or	Group	x	
Condition	x	Answer	interaction,	F(1,	120)	=	1.60,	p	=	.21,	ηp²	=.01,	indicating	that	the	provision	of	
feedback	did	not	affect	the	nature	of	metacognitive	judgements	among	either	group.	Finally,	the	
Group	x	Answer	interaction	was	not	significant,	F(1,	120)	=	.59,	p	=	.45,	ηp²	=	.005,	indicating	that	
both	groups	showed	higher	confidence	for	correct	than	incorrect	answers	(Figure	3).		
	
	
Figure	3.	Mean	confidence	in	correct	and	incorrect	answers	by	ASD	and	TD	participants	(error	bars	
indicate	the	95%	confidence	intervals	around	the	mean)	
 
	
Intention	monitoring	
Pre-test	intentions.	A	2	(Group)	x	2	(Condition)	between	participants	ANOVA	revealed	no	
significant	main	effects	of	Group,	F(1,	131)	=	1.82,	p	=	.18,	ηp²	=	.01,	or	Condition,	F(1,	131)	=	1.23,	p	
=	.27,	ηp²	=	.01.	The	Group	x	Condition	interaction	for	pre-test	intentions	was	also	not	significant,	
F(1,	131)	=	.57,	p	=	.45,	ηp²	=	.004.		
																																								 																				
3	Four	TD	participants	and	two	ASD	participants	did	not	produce	any	correct	answers,	and	four	ASD	
participants	did	not	produce	any	incorrect	answers.	These	participants	were	excluded	from	the	analysis.	
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Post-test	intentions.	A	2	(Group)	x	2	(Condition)	between	participants	ANOVA	revealed	no	
significant	main	effects	of	Group,	F(1,	131)	=	.06,	p	=	.80,	ηp²	<	.01,	or	Condition,	F(1,	131)	=	2.56,	p	=	
.11,	ηp²	=	.02.	The	Group	x	Condition	interaction	for	pre-test	intentions	was	also	not	significant,	F(1,	
131)	=	2.06,	p	=	.15,	ηp²	=	.02.		
Predicting	post-test	intentions	from	pre-test	intentions.	Pre-	and	post-test	intentions	were	
significantly	positively	correlated	for	both	ASD,	r	=	.64,	p	<	.001,	and	TD	groups,	r	=	.81,	p	<	.001.	To	
examine	whether	the	strength	of	the	association	between	pre-	and	post-test	intentions	was	similar	
for	both	groups,	Fisher’s	Z	transformations	were	conducted.	These	indicated	a	significantly	weaker	
association	between	pre-	and	post-test	intentions	for	the	ASD	group	compared	to	the	TD	group,	Zr1	–	
r2	=	1.89,	p	=	.03.	Figure	4	displays	average	post-test	intentions	(from	1	=	‘I	meant	to	get	it	wrong’	to	
3	‘I	meant	to	get	it	right’)	for	each	pre-test	intention	option	(from	1	=	‘I’m	going	to	try	to	get	it	
wrong’	to	3	=	‘I’m	going	to	try	to	get	it	right’)	for	errors	made	by	ASD	and	TD	groups.	The	TD	group	
showed	better	calibration	(with	scores	closer	to	the	dotted	line)	than	the	ASD	group.	
	
	
	
Figure	4.	Pre-	and	post-test	intentions	for	errors.	The	dotted	line	indicates	perfect	calibration.		
	
Metacognitive	questionnaire		
A	2	(Group)	x	2	(Condition)	MANOVA	was	conducted	with	participants’	four	self-reported	
metacognitive	ratings	(awareness	of	performance;	points	plan;	level	strategy	and	checking	of	
answers)	as	dependant	variables.	There	was	no	multivariate	effect	of	Group,	F(4,	128)	=	1.63,	p	=	.17,	
ηp²	=	.05,	or	Condition,	F(4,	128)	=	2.13,	p	=	.08,	ηp²	=	.06,	and	the	Group	x	Condition	interaction	was	
also	not	significant,	F(4,	128)	=	.61,	p	=	.66,	ηp²	=	.02.		
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Mathematics	performance:	Effect	of	feedback	
Groups	significantly	differed	on	starting	level	mathematics,	as	described	above	and	
evidenced	by	significantly	fewer	points	won	by	the	ASD	group	on	the	first	block	of	questions,	F(1,	
131)	=9.90,	p	=.002,	ηp²	=	.07,	with	no	main	effect	of	Condition	or	Group	x	Condition	interaction	at	
the	start	of	the	task	(ps	>.28).	To	examine	whether	feedback	was	effective	in	improving	self-
regulation,	as	measured	by	optimal	strategy	use	to	win	as	many	points	as	possible,	a	2	(Group)	x	2	
(Condition)	between	participants	ANOVA	was	conducted	for	points	won	on	the	final	block4.	There	
was	a	significant	effect	of	Condition,	F(1,	131)	=	6.57,	p	=	.01,	ηp²	=	.05,	whereby	more	points	were	
won	in	the	Feedback	(M	=	7.42,	SD	=	5.71)	compared	to	the	No	Feedback	condition	(M	=	5.43,	SD	=	
5.70)	but	no	significant	main	effect	of	Group,	F(1,	131)	=	1.61,	p	=	.21,	ηp²	=	.01	or	Group	x	Condition	
interaction,	F(1,	131)	=	2.59,	p	=	.11,	ηp²	=	.02.	Thus,	the	provision	of	feedback	improved	
performance	for	both	groups	(Figure	5).		
	
	 	
	
Figure	5.	Number	of	points	won	on	the	final	block	in	the	Maths	Challenge	as	a	function	of	Group	and	
Feedback	condition	(error	bars	indicate	the	95%	confidence	intervals	around	the	mean)	
	
	
																																								 																				
4	Since	ASD	and	TD	groups	differed	on	starting	level	mathematics	performance	(and	thus	the	number	of	points	
won	at	the	start	of	the	game),	strategy	would	be	expected	to	have	its	largest	effect	on	points	won	on	the	final	
block.	
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‘Metacognition’,	or	awareness	of	one’s	cognition,	makes	a	major	contribution	to	the	
learning	of	mathematics	and	is	a	better	predictor	of	educational	achievement	(e.g.,	exam	
performance)	than	assessments	of	intelligence.	Self-regulated	learning	requires	setting	one’s	own	
goals	in	relation	to	learning	and	ensuring	that	they	are	attained	(Efklides,	2011).	Effectively	
regulating	learning,	for	example	through	study	time	allocation	and	revision	methods,	is	dependent	
on	the	ability	to	monitor	what	and	how	much	material	is	known,	as	well	as	one’s	goals	and	
intentions	(Metcalfe,	2009;	Nelson	&	Narens,	1990).	Despite	the	metacognitive	difficulties	and	
educational	under	attainment	experienced	by	people	with	ASD,	no	research	has	specifically	targeted	
support	for	metacognition	and	self-regulated	learning	in	ASD.	The	context	of	self-regulated	learning	
has	been	argued	to	be	crucial,	requiring	research	to	be	as	context-sensitive	as	possible	(e.g.,	
Boekaerts	&	Corno,	2005);	thus,	the	aim	of	the	current	research	was	to	test	appropriate	
metacognitive	support	for	ASD	mathematics	learners	within	the	context	of	their	mathematics	
lessons.		
The	present	findings	indicate	that	ASD	leaners	can	successfully	distinguish	correct	from	
incorrect	answers.	This	is	contrary	to	previous	reports	that	autistic	children	show	diminished	
metacognitive	monitoring,	reporting	more	confidence	in	their	answers,	even	when	they	are	
incorrect	(e.g.,	Brosnan	et	al.,	2015;	Grainger	et	al.,	2016;	McMahon	et	al.,	2016;	Williams,	
Bergström	&	Grainger,	2017).	Findings	from	the	current	study	indicate	that	while	individuals	with	
ASD	showed	a	general	bias	toward	higher	confidence,	they	were	still	able	to	differentiate	correct	
from	incorrect	answers.	A	potential	explanation	for	the	current	diverging	findings	could	lie	with	the	
types	of	tasks	used,	with	the	present	study	adopting	a	non-socially	delivered	task	in	the	classroom	
context	with	elements	from	serious	gaming,	which	together	may	have	increased	ASD	learners’	
understanding,	engagement	and	intrinsic	motivation	in	the	task	(see	Kenworthy,	Yerys,	Anthony	&	
Wallace,	2008;	White,	Burgess	&	Hill,	2009;	Whyte,	Smyth	&	Schef,	2015).		
While	monitoring	the	accuracy	of	their	answers	appeared	undiminished,	learners	with	ASD	
nevertheless	showed	reduced	cohesion	between	their	pre-	and	post-test	intentions.	Including	a	
measure	of	pre-test	intentions	enabled	the	present	study	to	extend	previous	findings	by	Brosnan	et	
al.	(2015)	to	confirm	that	errors	made	on	mathematics	questions	were	not	intended,	and	therefore	
that	post-hoc	reporting	that	errors	had	been	intended	more	likely	reflects	diminished	intention	
monitoring.	This	is	important	as	a	diminished	sense	of	one’s	intentions	towards	a	task	could	have	a	
significant	impact	on	one’s	capacity	to	benefit	from	the	experience	of	attempting	the	task.	
Interestingly	there	were	no	differences	in	the	absolute	assessments	of	pre-	and	post-	intentions	to	
answer	questions	correctly;	the	group	difference	emerged	in	the	relationship	between	pre-	and	
post-	intentions,	thus	indicating	a	more	subtle	impairment	in	monitoring	one’s	own	intentions	in	
ASD.	
Learners	with	ASD	benefited	from	metacognitive	support,	as	evidenced	by	their	better	
performance	in	the	Feedback	compared	to	the	No	Feedback	condition.	Although	the	Group	x	
Condition	interaction	did	not	reach	statistical	significance,	this	feedback	support	appeared	to	be	less	
effective	for	the	TD	group	(Figure	5);	however	these	young	people	did	not	have	a	metacognitive	
deficit.	The	error	bars	in	Figure	5	highlight	the	variability	in	performance	and	the	need	for	caution	in	
interpreting	the	data,	but	with	no	feedback	the	ASD	group	average	around	half	the	number	of	points	
of	the	TD	group	and	slightly	more	points	than	the	TD	group	with	the	provision	of	feedback.	The	
provision	of	feedback,	goal	and	strategy	support	may	be	most	effective	for	learners	who	have	
difficulties	in	metacognitive	monitoring.		
Higgins	et	al.	(2013)	report	that	supporting	metacognition	is	a	fast,	efficient	and	low	cost	
method	for	supporting	learning.	Consistent	with	this,	the	present	research	suggests	that	for	learners	
with	diminished	metacognitive	monitoring,	metacognitive	support	should:	(i)	affirm	the	goal	(e.g.,	to	
get	the	answer	correct);	(ii)	feedback	immediately	(e.g.,	whether	the	answer	was	correct/incorrect);	
and	(iii)	reflect	on	the	goal	(e.g.,	intention	monitoring).	A	limitation	of	the	present	study	is	that	it	was	
not	possible	to	disentangle	the	relative	benefits	of	each	of	these	components	of	metacognitive	
support	provided	by	the	feedback	condition.	This	is	especially	pertinent	in	the	context	of	the	present	
findings	of	an	intention	monitoring	deficit	alongside	undiminished	accuracy	monitoring.	For	
example,	it	is	unclear	whether	the	provision	of	feedback	about	performance	was	a	necessary	
component	in	supporting	task	performance,	or	whether	goal	reminders	alone	would	be	sufficient.	
Moreover,	although	successful	performance	on	the	Maths	Challenge	was	dependent	on	strategy	
regulation	(to	win	as	many	points	as	possible),	the	present	study	did	not	extricate	where	group	
differences	lay	in	metacognitive	strategy	regulation.	Further	analysis	of	participants’	self-selecting	of	
difficulty	level,	for	example,	may	reveal	differences	between	the	two	groups.	If	learners	with	ASD	are	
also	poorer	at	judging	when	to	best	shift	difficulty	levels,	despite	when	feedback	is	provided,	
implementing	Dynamic	Difficulty	Adjustment	(DDA)	(Hunicke,	2005),	where	game	difficulty	is	
modified	automatically	in	response	to	students’	answers,	may	be	beneficial.	Anderson	(2012)	
proposed	developing	a	framework	of	conceptual	knowledge	for	the	teaching	of	fractions	in	a	Digital	
Educational	Game,	where	the	game	keeps	track	of	players’	knowledge	and	adapts	the	difficulty	level	
accordingly.	Future	work	may	investigate	differences	in	performance	between	self-selecting	
difficulty	and	DDA,	and	whether	this	can	further	support	metacognition	in	ASD.	Finally,	the	level	of	
challenge	in	the	current	study	was	individualised,	which	may	be	significant	in	the	efficacy	of	support	
(e.g.,	not	too	easy/hard).	Future	research	should	tease	apart	these	aspects	in	order	to	more	
specifically	target	where	support	is	needed	in	terms	of	metacognitive	monitoring,	intentions	and	
self-regulation	respectively.	
	These	steps	to	support	learning	would	be	expected	to	extend	to	all	learners	with	deficits	in	
metacognitive	monitoring,	not	just	those	with	ASD,	although	this	needs	to	be	assessed	empirically.	
There	may	be	other	reasons	underpinning	poor	mathematical	performance,	such	as	developmental	
dyscalculia,	which	is	thought	to	be	a	deficit	in	a	basic	capacity	for	understanding	numerosity	(e.g.,	
Butterworth,	2004).	People	with	ASD	may	also	have	additional	deficits	in	numerosity	(e.g.,	Aagten-
Murphy	et	al.,	2015),	which	one	would	not	expect	to	be	ameliorated	though	interventions	
addressing	metacognition.	The	ASD	group	were	mostly	working	at	a	Key	Stage	level	below	where	
they	were	expected	to	be	working	(the	TD	group	were	not).	Thus,	whilst	the	ASD	group	were	found	
to	benefit	from	feedback,	this	does	not	necessitate	that	they	were	consequently	at	the	same	
academic	level	as	the	control	group.	Future	research	could	assess	both	mathematical	skills	and	
metacognitive	skills	to	establish	any	interrelationships.	We	would	expect	that	supporting	
metacognitive	monitoring	would	be	the	first	step	in	addressing	numerosity	deficits.	It	is	worth	
reiterating,	however,	that	whilst	people	with	ASD	typically	show	a	specific	impairment	in	
mathematical	ability	incommensurate	with	their	IQ,	there	is	also	a	small	group	of	mathematically	
gifted	people	with	ASD	(Aagten-Murphy	et	al.,	2015;	Chiang	&	Lin,	2006;	Iuculano	et	al.,	2014;	Jones	
et	al.,	2009;	Mayes	&	Calhoun,	2003;	2006).	The	present	finding	may	not	extend	to	such	a	group,	and	
it	would	be	interesting	to	identify	how	metacognition	and	numerosity	skills	differentiated	this	
mathematically	gifted	sub	group	from	the	typical	ASD	profile.	
Metacognitive	monitoring	is	considered	essential	for	a	sense	of	‘self-concept’	(Roebers	et	al.,	
2012)	and	for	day-to-day	behavioural	functioning,	because	accurate	monitoring	of	one’s	internal	
states	facilitates	the	regulation	of	and	control	over	those	states,	and	over	learning	and	behaviour	
(Nelson	&	Leonesio,	1988).	We	have	used	the	term	metacognitive	monitoring	to	encompass	
assessments	of	intention	before	and	after	each	task,	and	accuracy,	as	well	as	the	capacity	to	control	
appropriate	cognitive	responses	to	these	assessments.	This	process	has	been	distinguished	from	
metacognitive	knowledge	of	cognition,	which	is	the	stored	acquired	knowledge	of	cognition	(e.g.	‘I	
am	better	at	arithmetic	than	I	am	at	spelling’;	Flavell,	1979;	Lockl	&	Schneider,	2002;	Nelson	&	
Narens,	1990;	Schraw	&	Moshman,	1995).	Despite	differences	between	groups	in	intention	
monitoring,	there	were	no	self-reported	differences	on	the	metacognition	questionnaire.	If	we	
assume	that	the	intervention	did	effectively	target	metacognitive	monitoring,	it	may	be	that	those	
with	ASD	are	unable	to	self-report	their	own	metacognition.	This	is	consistent	with	Williams	and	
Happé	(2010)	who	argue	that	a	metacognitive	understanding	of	one’s	own	mind	may	be	more	
impaired	in	ASD	than	the	metacognitive	understanding	of	other	people’s	minds.	Indeed,	Grainger	et	
al.	(2014)	report	that	despite	behaviourally	demonstrating	impaired	metacognition	(compared	to	
controls),	people	with	ASD	self-reported	higher	levels	of	metacognition.		
It	is	a	limitation	of	the	present	study	that	that	we	did	not	undertake	an	independent	
assessment	of	autism	diagnosis.	Working	within	the	schools,	this	was	not	feasible.	We	used	a	
convenience	sample	within	the	school	environment,	which	resulted	in	a	male	dominated	sample	
consistent	with	the	reported	male	domination	of	those	who	receive	a	diagnosis	(for	example,	our	
ratio	of	3:1	is	close	to	Baird	et	al.	(2006)	who	report	3.3:1).	The	matching	of	ASD	and	TD	groups	on	
cognitive	ability	in	such	a	novel	study	was	also	not	ideal	as	mathematical	ability	level	was	derived	
from	teacher	report	and	not	formal	independent	testing	(again	within	the	classroom	context,	
additional	assessments	were	not	feasible).	With	suboptimal	matching	we	cannot	discount	the	
possibility	that	group	differences	in	metacognitive	ability	were	the	result	of	general	cognitive	
differences	rather	than	diagnostic	group	membership	per	se.	Independent	assessments	of	both	
autism	diagnosis	and	mathematical	abilities	would	enable	a	more	fine-grained	analysis	which	would	
be	useful	additions	to	future	research.	However,	when	examining	the	relationship	between	
metacognition	and	mathematics	performance,	the	present	study’s	focus	upon	being	context-specific	
to	the	classroom	may	prove	crucial.		
To	conclude,	the	present	study	reports	a	novel	investigation	of	the	impact	of	metacognitive	
support	on	autistic	children’s	mathematics	performance	–	the	results	of	which	have	the	potential	to	
make	a	significant	impact	on	autism	education.	It	is	now	widely	recognised	that	there	is	a	vital	need	
for	evidence-based	guidance	to	enable	improvements	in	educational	provision	for	pupils	with	ASD	
(e.g.,	Charman,	et	al.,	2011;	Keen	et	al.,	2016;	Wilkinson	&	Twist,	2010).	An	existing	body	of	research	
indicates	a	metacognitive	deficit	in	ASD,	coupled	with	underachievement	in	mathematics	that	is	in	
disaccord	with	intellectual	ability.	The	present	findings	add	to	this	and	indicate	that	support	for	
metacognitive	assessments	of	accuracy	and	post-test	intention	monitoring	may	be	particularly	
crucial	targets	for	supporting	learners	with	ASD	in	mathematics,	with	the	potential	to	remove	widely	
reported	under	achievement	in	mathematics.	 	
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